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Özyürek’s Nostalgia for the Modern is a meticulously researched,
methodologically innovative and theoretically sophisticated work that will
further invigorate the budding ethnographic literature on Turkey.1 More
generally, it will contribute to ethnographies of the nation in which the
nation-state—rather than the smaller and more typical village or
community—comprises the object of anthropological inquiry.
Taking her cue from R. Williams,2 Özyürek introduces her study as an
exploration of the “structure of feeling” of nostalgia shared by the Kemalist
elite and citizens who yearn for the early years of the Turkish Republic. This
yearning, Özyürek argues, is new in that it involves what she calls the
“privatization of republican ideology and imagery” through, for example,
the adornment of private interiors with republican symbols, the
commodification and consumption of Atatürk insignia, or the interest in the
life stories of first-generation republican citizens. Building on Svetlana
Boym’s analysis of nostalgia3 as integral to modernity (rather than as
indicative of disillusionment with modernity), Özyürek inquires how
recent Kemalist nostalgia articulates with the neo-liberal economy and the
current political scene. She argues that Kemalist nostalgia and its
personalization of politics is contingent on two simultaneous processes: On
the one hand, it is contingent on the incorporation of the neo-liberal
symbolism of privatization, market choice, and voluntarism into the etatism
and nationalism of Kemalist ideology; on the other hand, it is dependent on
the Kemalists’ strategic deployment of such symbolism as a retort to the
perceived threats posed by political Islam and the Kurdish movement.
Chapter 1 critically addresses the surge of interest in the private lives of
first-generation republican citizens. Based on in-depth interviews with
octogenarians who are paradoxically dubbed “children of the Republic,”
Özyürek demonstrates how these staunch Kemalists take pains to
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underscore their ardent support for the single-party rule. As Özyürek’s
perceptive narrative analysis reveals, they do so primarily by subsuming
their life histories under the official textbook version of republican history. In
an analytically smart and theoretically well-justified move, instead of trying
to catch the contradictions or to unearth the truly authentic in these carefully
crafted stories, Özyürek precisely chooses to engage with their framing for
public consumption. The systematic self-censure of details considered
private leads Özyürek to view nostalgia not as a reflection on the past, but
rather as a strategy that serves the present. The very presentation of personal
lives as the ultimate fulfillment of Kemalist ideals facilitates a defense of the
republican regime against its critics who see it as as authoritarian.
If the framing of the life story is one innovative research site where
Özyürek locates Kemalist nostalgia, contemporary museum exhibits—the
subject of chapter 2—constitute another. As part of the 75th anniversary
celebrations of the Turkish Republic, public intellectuals and academics
organized various exhibits hosted by NGOs and commercial institutions
such as banks—an unprecedented delegation of representational authority
beyond official state jurisdiction, as Özyürek notes. These exhibits sought
to depict the early republican period along with contemporary modern
lifestyles as its legacies. In harmony with the neo-liberal framework of
freedom and voluntarism, the exhibit organizers downplayed the
authoritarian aspects of the early republican period and emphasized
instead the “willing, collectively shared and intimately internalized
relationship of citizens to Turkish modernity.”4 There was, however,
slippage between intention and reception: Based on evidence gathered
from visitor books, Özyürek astutely observes that most spectators
persisted on viewing the relationship between the state and citizen not in
the neo-liberal terms of voluntarism, but in the authoritarian terms of
paternalism and obligation.
Also inspired by the market symbolism of choice and will is the novel
approach which informed the organization of the 75th anniversary
celebrations. Chapter 4 elaborates how the organizers, once again NGO
representatives and intellectuals rather than state officials, aimed at
spontaneity and the expression of personal enthusiasm, in contrast to the
usual structured official commemorations. Once again Özyürek adroitly
situates this seeming substitution of free market ideals for those of state
planning in historical perspective and reveals the echoes of the 1933 tenth
anniversary celebrations in the 1998 celebrations. Noting that the idea of
4 Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2006), 91.
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voluntary citizen participation was politically expedient right after the
suppression of a democratically elected Islamic government via military
intervention, Özyürek states that the deployment of neo-liberal discourses
by Kemalist intellectuals and officials “reconciles the memory of the single-
party regime with the market, rather than preparing the grounds for the
replacement of state ideology by the market.”5
The proliferation and commodification of Atatürk imagery—now
printed on posters, mugs, T-shirts, and used in advertisements—is yet
another way in which the authority of the Turkish state is masked under the
guise of consumer choice. In chapter 3, Özyürek points to a shift away from
monument-like and stern images of Atatürk that ordinarily command
public space and towards miniaturized images that depict a more
“humanized” Atatürk—such as the first publicly smiling statue of Atatürk,
pictures that portray him lying on the grass, drinking, in the company of
women; that is to say, pictures that citizen consumers “can incorporate into
their private lives and engage with in a less hierarchical relationship.”6
Özyürek suggests that this commodified reclamation of Atatürk can be
viewed both as a retort to the proliferation of Islamic symbols and practices
and as the legitimization of the state in the neo-liberal era when privatizing
a state icon verifies state support by volition rather than force. As Özyürek
perceptively argues, however, while indexing free choice, these acts
simultaneously facilitate the entry of ideological state symbols into the
most intimate domains.
The final ethnographic chapter allocates space to the Islamists and their
claim to their share of nostalgia for the foundational years. Islamists, in
turn, point to the religious aspects of the Republic in the 1920s, thus
alleging that the later suppression of religious practices is a deviation from
the original principles. In analyzing the Kemalists and Islamists’
competing interpretations of the history of the Turkish Republic, Özyürek
reiterates—and thereby nicely completes the circle that she set in motion in
chapter 1—the approach to “memory as a presentist act that reconfigures
contemporary, rather than past, relations and structures of power.”7
At the end of the day, as Özyürek underscores in her concluding chapter,
more market symbolism does not mean less state authority. To the contrary,
private citizens utilize the new market symbolism to defend and reinforce
state ideology and, by personalizing it, create a new—and perhaps even
reinforced—connection between state and citizen. One could ask if this is
5 Ibid., 150.
6 Ibid., 95.
7 Ibid., 154.
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yet another Levi-Straussian instance of “plus ça change, plus c’est la même
chose”? Not quite, for, according to Özyürek, the “old ideologies and
symbolisms [are] finding themselves new homes in the personal, domestic,
market-related and civic arenas—transforming them in the process.”8
Özyürek spots these transformations in new forms of personalized
expressions of politics, in new connections forged with neo-liberalism, or
in the idea of voluntary citizen participation. She takes the argument about
transformations even further to conclude that the “new choice-based and
affective engagement with Kemalist representations and ideology defied the
unquestionable dominance of the founding ideology in Turkey” and that
the “new circulation of the Turkish state symbolism as a part of market
principles marks the end of corporatist and etatist Kemalism and revives it in
a new form.”9 One wonders here whether Özyürek’s language is not too
strong. For a political culture in which—as Özyürek herself acknowledges—
Kemalism perseveres as the legitimating symbol for most movements from
the center-left to the right, might we not need a vocabulary more subdued
than that of defiance and endings? Perhaps a Gramscian framework that
describes the shift from a transformative to an expansive hegemony might
lead us to also inquire about the ways in which the neo-liberal versions of
Kemalism (which Özyürek suggests to call nostalgic Kemalism or neo-
Kemalism) merge with right-wing nationalism. Or, it might lead us to
reconsider Özyürek’s usage of “secularist” as shorthand for Kemalist, a
designation that risks the reification of Kemalists and Islamists as
diametrically opposed groups and thereby overlooks their mutually
constitutive, shared political culture.10 Finally, the preceding and more
radical challenges to Kemalism from certain wings on the left, including
those of non-nationalist Kurdish protesters, as counter-hegemonic forces
need perhaps to be more explicitly situated vis-à-vis the more recent and
milder challenges of neo-liberalism.
That said, Nostalgia for the Modern makes an excellent contribution to
the recent critical scholarship on Kemalism. Özyürek offers fine-tuned and
illuminating discussions of the emergent culture of neo-liberalism and its
relation to Kemalism and manages to do so in a highly charged political
field. It is obvious that she has masterfully navigated what must have been
a thorny ethnographic field peopled by fervent interlocutors. She strikes an
admirable balance between effacement and over-presence with regard to
8 Ibid., 180.
9 Ibid., 182, all italics mine.
10 Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State; Taha Parla, Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynaklar›: Atatürk’ün
Nutuk’u (‹stanbul: ‹letiflim, 1991).
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her own voice and positionality and remains disinterested but extremely
engaged throughout. Her prose is elegant, yet free of jargon, and the
arguments are multi-layered and nuanced without compromising clarity.
An extremely timely and welcome addition to political anthropology and
the ethnography of Turkey, Özyürek’s study also has much to offer to those
interested in the relationship between nostalgia and modernity, the public
and the private, and neo-liberalism and nationalism.
Ayfle Parla
Sabanc› University
Keyman, E. Fuat, and Ahmet ‹çduygu, eds. Citizenship in a Global World:
European Questions and Turkish Experiences. London: Routledge,
2005.
This collection starts with the premise that Turkish modernity in general
and its key component, the republican model of governance, in particular
have been suffering from an ongoing crisis, as a result of its state-centric
orientation that prioritizes national interest over individual liberties and
“state sovereignty over individual autonomy.”1 Keyman and ‹çduygu argue
that both the source of this chronic crisis of governance and legitimacy in
Turkish politics and its solution lie in the issue of citizenship. The authors
state that the crisis of modernity in Turkey is simultaneously a crisis of the
republican model of citizenship; therefore, a democratic reconstruction of
modernity is possible only through the creation of a constitutional, multi-
cultural, democratic regime of citizenship.
Even though this collection brings together scholars of Turkish studies,
the main approach developed in the introduction goes far beyond the case
of Turkey and poses the question of citizenship in rather global terms,
developing a critical understanding of citizenship and its relation to
democracy in a much broader frame. By doing so, it certainly deserves the
title Citizenship in a Global World. According to the authors, citizenship
involves not only a set of legal measures that regulate the relationship
between the state and the individual, but also the relationship between the
individual and his/her group identities, as well as the complex web of
relationships among such groups and between them and the state. Defining
citizenship in such broad terms not only allows for its analysis as an
1 E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet ‹çduygu, eds., Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and
Turkish Experiences (London: Routledge, 2005), 6.
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